The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 
1
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was formed after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 , as part of a national effort to safeguard the United States homeland from future threats. The DHS is comprised of five separate branches with each branch responsible for a specific security related task. These branches consist of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). While each DHS branch has critical components in the overall security of our nation, this paper will focus on the responsibilities of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, its sub-component agencies and their specific security responsibilities along our nation's southern border with Mexico.
As its name implies, Customs and Border Protection or CBP has the ultimate responsibility for securing our borders. This branch serves as the first line of defense against illegal smuggling and terrorist activity associated with the border. In addition, the CBP also addresses trade issues and is tasked with tariff collection for all incoming and outgoing goods.
2 As a sister branch to the CBP, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement or ICE is the largest branch of DHS and is responsible for enforcing all laws regarding immigrants and goods coming into the country. It is primarily an investigative branch focused on intelligence and information gathering. 3 The CBP in conjunction with its ICE counterparts is responsible for the security of over 1,950 miles 2 of the southern border with Mexico including the management and supervision of 46 separate legal crossing stations and gates. 4 Keeping our borders secure from potential terrorists, illegal immigrants, and illicit contraband is a strategic issue vital to the safety and security of the United States.
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Since 2006, the illicit trafficking and entrance of illegal aliens and narcotics has shown major growth on our southern border with Mexico. The increased narcotics trafficking, coupled with Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) and their associated violence has elevated the problem to near crisis proportions, jeopardizing the United
States' national interests and regional security. 6 Insert this "wicked problem" into the ongoing escalation of Mexican drug cartel crime and one begins to see the enormous challenges that face the Department of Homeland Security and its enforcement agencies diligently working these complex issues.
Truth is, for the past eleven years American attention to the growing threat on our southern border has been overshadowed by the ongoing struggles faced in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and more recently, our nation's economic problems, which are only now slowly turning around. It has been stated, that because of the lengthy focus on our current war in Afghanistan, many of our national security experts have largely overlooked the volatile and bitter counter cartel war in Mexico. In his recent essay, In border towns from Tijuana / San Ysidro, California to Matamoros / Brownsville, Texas the concern is real and has reached a tipping point. In Laredo, Texas alone, trade between the United States and Mexico is worth more than $1billion annually. 9 In 2012, Texas Governor, Rick Perry garnered national attention by demanding that President Barrack Obama provide National Guard troops to protect the state's southern border.
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The request failed due to the inability to figure out who would pay for the $225 million dollar security proposal. Still, Americans are asking that something be done to address this problem which should be addressed sooner than later. Initial cost estimates for the virtual fence were considerably cheaper than the alternative brick-and-mortar structure or "border-wall" development option. The "border-wall" option had an estimated price-tag of $7.5 million dollars per mile of wall constructed compared to the $1 million dollar per mile price-tag for virtual fence technology.
However, Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano -citing cost overruns and missed deadlines -announced in March 2010 that work on SBInet would be suspended pending a broad reassessment of the program. At that time, she said that $50 million dollars in funding originally targeted for SBInet would be diverted to other "tested and commercially available technology." 14 It is assumed that some of this funding mentioned above found its way to the Predator UAV program through its controlling agency, the Office of Air and Marine.
While the Predator UAV program has had success, it has been incredibly expensive.
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So expensive and man-hour intensive is the Predator program that many have asked whether the Predator program is cost-effective. The broad reassessment of SBInet and border security technologies continues today with no quick resolution in sight.
Meanwhile, our southern border with Mexico remains vulnerable and accessible to the ever increasing illicit activity of the TCOs, Mexican drug cartels and human traffickers.
In fact, according to a 2009 Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) estimate, drugs smuggled through the southern border in Arizona alone will top $10 billion dollars in annual sales and this figure is projected to increase if left to the current operational abilities of the CBP. 15 Without doubt, UAV technology is an important part of law enforcement's recognized three-dimensional attack on transnational crime -the movement of people, guns, money and drugs across borders -that currently fuels the multibillion dollar illicit trafficking industry. 16 Border security has been compared to a balloon where illicit activity corridors shift to areas without security. If one pushes on a balloon at one point, a different area of the balloon protrudes out. The same is true with areas or corridors of illicit activity. When one corridor gets hot, typically the CBP answers with increased security forcing those partaking in the illicit activity to find a new corridor of entry.
As technology increases the capabilities of the Department of Homeland
Security, the capabilities of those participating in the illicit activity also increase or shift Gulf of Mexico to avoid detection from United States law enforcement. The UAV is aptly suited for a variety of missions as they are capable to cover large areas and can carry multiple sensor payloads that can be tailored to a specific mission. Depending on whether one is searching for the latest trafficking tunnel, looking for an individual or group crossing the border in rugged terrain or trying to target and identify a radio signal, UAV technology can conform to all border security requirements. 17 As previously mentioned, the current UAV being used on the southern border is the General Atomics Aeronautical Systems' Predator. The DHS Predator UAVs are configured with a satellite-data-link system and as mentioned earlier can loiter above a target for up to 40 hours dependent on the particular flight environment. The Predator is a bit smaller than a small private jet but is considered large in the current realm of UAVs. The DHS Predator payload includes two color video cameras, an infrared camera that offers night vision capability and synthetic aperture radar that provides high resolution video. 18 The DHS Predator currently has authorization to fly in Class A airspace along the border through special approval from the Federal Aviation In a recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on border security published in March, 2012, the GAO attempted to identify opportunities to ensure more effective use of DHS's air and marine assets. In the report, GAO stated that OAM was unable to meet 27%, or 10,530 of the 38,662 air support requests it received from customers (CBP and ICE) in fiscal year 2010. 27 The primary reason for unmet requests was the number of aircraft in maintenance. Adverse weather and unavailable aircrews were cited as additional factors for lack of support. 28 While the report did not differentiate between manned and unmanned aircraft, unmanned aircraft requests were included in the overall findings. The report did include comments from regional officials and leaders garnered by the GAO during their visits to field locations within a particular region. One Border Patrol Assistant Chief for a southeast region sector stated that OAM had not been responsive to its air support requests. He also stated that in some instances, Border Patrol agents may not have asked for air support in fiscal year 2010 because they thought they might not receive it. 29 After all, there are only six Predator UAVs in the entire OAM fleet to cover nearly 2000 miles of the southern border. In one southwest location, OAM branch officials said the air assets at their location were barely sufficient to meet support requests for its various missions, and ICE officials said that they would like to see OAM procure better aircraft for their surveillance needs. 30 In addition, Border Patrol officials in the same southwest location said that while the sector receives substantial OAM air support, OAM as an agency is not adequately resourced in budget, facilities, air frames, or technology to meet operational requirements. Specifically, Border Patrol officials in a southwest border sector told GAO inspectors that there were gaps in OAM's ability to provide air mission support for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). Similarly, Border Patrol, OAM, and ICE field officials in another southwest region location said OAM lacked the capability to perform effective maritime (air to water) patrols, and ICE officials in their location said that helicopters were often not available on short notice. 31 This aspect is critical for possible surveillance of illicit activity through a Predator UAV over the Pacific or Gulf of Mexico with no helicopter interdiction assets available.
The GAO went on to survey 18 separate OAM air locations for the report and found that 11 of the 18 were either somewhat or very dissatisfied with the extent to which they had adequate air personnel to effectively meet mission needs. In addition, field officials interviewed in the southwest and southeast regions reported shortages in air personnel, and the southwest regional director stated that he did not have adequate personnel to be able to respond 24-hours a day at each of the region's locations. 32 A shortage in air personnel was a common theme throughout the report. For example, the Director of Air Operations at a northern border branch said that the branch was originally slated to have 60 pilots, but instead had 20 pilots due to budgeting constraints.
Officials from two branches in the southwest region told GAO inspectors that they lacked personnel due to staff being away for such reasons as temporary duty assignments, military leave, sick leave, and training. They all said that these shortages were negatively affecting their ability to meet air support requests. 33 Further, the GAO reported that the OAM had in fact taken actions to increase aircraft availability, but the results of their efforts had not been realized. It was noted that OAM had created an aircraft modernization plan in 2006 to replace aging aircraft, and even updated this plan in 2007 with a model of projected investments over the next 10 years. OAM officials reported to GAO that due to changes in mission needs and changes in the aviation market, as well as the ever present issue of limited funding, they have had to modify the plan and continue to maintain older and less supportable aircraft, which require additional maintenance. OAM officials went on to report that because they have not been able to replace aircraft as postulated, they have not been able to standardize their fleet by reducing aircraft types -which would reduce costs associated with training materials and equipment, parts and spares inventories, and personnel requirements (including UAV training and qualifications). 34 Even though the GAO reported multiple problems concerning personnel, operations management, aircraft maintenance and budget, it is evident that most government agencies are facing many of the same dilemmas in this time of economic belt tightening. Exacerbating this problem is the fact that across the governmental agency spectrum (military included), mission load and operational tempo has increased rather than mirroring the drastic decreases in personnel manning, training, and operational budget.
Is the Utilization of Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (SUAVs) at the Agent Level the Solution for Increased Security on our Southern Border?
Companies involved in UAV technologies are constantly enhancing current capabilities and redefining the purpose and mission roles of the unmanned aerial vehicle. Truth be known, the UAV industry is growing so fast that security managers, They are much less man-power and maintenance intensive and require a fraction of the training to operate than do the larger aircraft. The most important fact is that these small UAVs, aptly coined Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (SUAVs), can be procured and integrated into an organization's ISR programs for a fraction of what it costs to utilize a UAV like the Predator system that is currently in use at the Department of Homeland Security.
To increase perspective on current SUAV technologies and to offer options to the current DHS UAV program, this paper will introduce three separate examples of SUAVs. These particular SUAVs were selected for inclusion due to their availability, efficiencies and combat proven abilities to match the border ISR mission requirements of the DHS and should not be considered all inclusive.
The first example SUAV is Insitu Corporation's ScanEagle. This SUAV was developed in partnership with Boeing and is a low-altitude, long-endurance (LALE)
aircraft that flies at a mission altitude of approximately 3000 feet. The system features a pneumatic-catapult launch system and a Global Positioning System (GPS) enabled retrieval system that allows a using agency to literally snatch the UAV out of the air.
These launch and recovery systems provide the using agency with what is known in the industry as "runway-independence" and allows ScanEagle to be launched and recovered from small ships, unimproved terrain and in remote regions easily conforming to the entire southern border ISR mission (including the Southern California Pacific Ocean, the Baja peninsula and the Texas border with the Gulf of Mexico).
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The ScanEagle has an equally capable payload. It features an inertially stabilized camera that can track both fixed and moving objects for extended periods through utilization of an integrated GPS. The ScanEagle weighs in at less than 55 pounds and is capable of remaining "on-station" for more than 24 hours without refueling. The launcher and aircraft can be deployed anywhere by two personnel.
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When asked about the ScanEagle's capabilities, Paul McDuffee, Insitu's Vice President of Commercial Business Development stated, "This is a vehicle that will go out and fly a prescribed flight path that is uploaded to the aircraft and conduct that path without any intervention from a pilot." 38 McDuffee continued by stating, "ScanEagle is ideal for use along the border as it is portable, it is mobile and it can be redeployed relatively quickly over fairly significant distances and operate where it is most needed." 39 The ScanEagle platform was developed as a tactical surveillance system and can survey between 50 and 100 miles up and down the border at low altitudes.
Currently the Department of Defense is Insitu's main customer because current FAA airspace restrictions limit the use of ScanEagle by commercial and public safety entities;
as such entities would be required to obtain FAA approval for special use under a special certificate of operations. However, Insitu leadership remains hopeful that the border states of California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas will be the first states to acquire the special use certificates from the FAA. Insitu executives believe that ScanEagle's ability to fly at lower altitudes give it a competitive advantage when it comes to obtaining the FAA's special use permission and certificate. Paul McDuffie speculates, "If the FAA opens airspace to unmanned aircraft, they are going to do it in an incremental basis -starting small and moving to the larger platforms." 40 It is very likely that small UAVs will win FAA approval first, over and above the larger UAV platforms like Predator. Doing so would allow the SUAVs to serve as a "test-bed" for incorporating UAVs into manned airspace. Testing airspace compatibility with SUAVs at low altitudes vs. the higher altitudes utilized by manned aircraft and systems like
Predator will show that UAVs can, in fact, be integrated safely into manned airspace.
The second example, and another Afghanistan War proven SUAV is the RQ-20A, Puma AE. The Puma was developed by AeroVironment Corporation and is currently deployed at the small unit level in the United States Army. The Puma is the newest addition to the Army's UAV program and will number 323 separate systems (3 aircraft per system) when fully fielded. Much smaller than ScanEagle mentioned above, the Puma AE weighs just 13 pounds and was designed for combat environments, man portable for ease of mobility, and requires no auxiliary equipment for launch or recovery operations. 41 The system is fully waterproof, is quiet to avoid detection and operates autonomously, providing persistent intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting data (ISRT). Puma AE carries both an electro-optical ( would increase efficiencies in manning, training, UAV availability and utilization.
In addition, tapping into the lower altitudes that SUAVs utilize in FAA controlled airspace could solve many airspace coordination issues prevalent in deconflicting airspace for the much larger Predator flying at much higher altitudes. Outfitting CBP agents along the southern border will increase user agent's situational awareness on the ground and will increase individual agent safety. Ultimately, shifting from large to small UAVs will increase DHS's ability to protect and secure our southern border while decreasing its total operational budget. Realized cost savings could be utilized to man, train and field enough SUAVs to provide proper ISR coverage of our southern border. SUAVs are an asset whose time has come. Current SUAV technology, capability and affordability dictate that Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles are in fact, the Department of Homeland Security's answer to its southern border intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance requirements.
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